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Background: To better understand how stock-outs of the first line antimalarial, Artemisinin-based Combination
Therapy (ACT) and other non-compliant health worker behaviour, influence household expenditures during
care-seeking for fever in the Ulanga District in Tanzania.
Methods: We combined weekly ACT stock data for the period 2009-2011 from six health facilities in the Ulanga
District in Tanzania, together with household data from 333 respondents on the cost of fever care-seeking in
Ulanga during the same time period to establish how health seeking behaviour and expenditure might vary
depending on ACT availability in their nearest health facility.
Results: Irrespective of ACT stock-outs, more than half (58%) of respondents sought initial care in the public sector,
the remainder seeking care in the private sector where expenditure was higher by 19%. Over half (54%) of
respondents who went to the public sector reported incidences of non-compliant behaviour by the attending
health worker (e.g. charging those who were eligible for free service or referring patients to the private sector
despite ACT stock), which increased household expenditure per fever episode from USD0.14 to USD1.76. ACT
stock-outs were considered to be the result of non-compliant behaviour of others in the health system and
increased household expenditure by 21%; however we lacked sufficient statistical power to confirm this finding.
Conclusion: System design and governance challenges in the Tanzanian health system have resulted in numerous
ACT stock-outs and frequent non-compliant public sector health worker behaviour, both of which increase out-of-pocket
health expenditure. Interventions are urgently needed to ensure a stable supply of ACT in the public sector and increase
health worker accountability.
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Universal Coverage
The key goals of universal coverage as outlined in the
World Health Report 2011 require knowledge about: the
proportion of the population covered by health services,
together with widening the range of available services and
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distribution, and reproduction in any medium[1]. In order to meet these objectives, some countries have
focused their efforts on achieving universal coverage for
selected health topics by developing essential medicines
lists, which, according to the WHO, identify medicines
that “satisfy the priority health care needs of the popula-
tion” and should be available at prices the public can af-
ford, with assured quality.Essential Medicines in Tanzania
Tanzania’s current 2007 National Essential Medicines
List includes medicines for 26 priority conditions, one ofd Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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concern in Tanzania especially for children under five
years and pregnant women [3]. Expenditure on malaria
programs make up 19.4% of total health expenditure and
1.6% of GDP [4]. The disease places a large burden on
the health sector accounting for around 40% of out-
patient department visits in 2008 [5]. Since 2006, the
first-line antimalarial for uncomplicated malaria in
Tanzania is an Artemisin-based Combination Therapy
(ACT) - Artemether lumefantrine (Alu). However, given
the high costs of ACT, Tanzania was granted USD75 mil-
lion from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria (henceforth referred to as the ‘Global Fund’)
during its Round 4 in 2005 (and currently through
Round 9) to purchase ACTs (which come in four doses
based on patient weight). Tanzania’s National Malaria
Control Programme is responsible for forecasting ACT
demand and managing Global Fund grants for malaria
[6], while the Pharmaceutical Supply Unit is charged
with setting policy on medicines and supplies and
budgeting for medicines. It also monitors the use of funds
and supervises health facilities. The Medical Stores
Department (MSD) handles ACT procurement, sto-
rage and distribution together with other medicines [7].
Health facilities order ACTs along with other medicines
through a ‘pull’ system via the Integrated Logistic System
(ILS) [8]. The ACTs are provided at no charge to health
facilities and, according to policy, are dispensed free to
children under the age of five and to adults over 60 years
of age [9]. Those covered by a health insurance fund
(National Health Insurance Fund or the Community
Health Fund) (www.nhif.or.tz/) are also exempt from pay-
ment at the health facility [10,11]. Others pay a user fee
of TZS1000 (USD0.70) (2007 fee) [12], although inde-
pendent confirmation has found this to vary and can
be as low as TZS500 per visit. According to the Integrated
Management of Childhood Illnesses Guidelines (IMCI),
ACTs are given as a presumptive treatment in the absence
of diagnostic tests when a child reports with fever
without other symptoms such as rapid breathing or
runny nose which could indicate pneumonia or a com-
mon cold [13]. Apart from ACT, other antimalarials are
Sulphadoxine – Pyrimethamine (SP), which is recom-
mended only as intermittent preventive treatment du-
ring pregnancy, and quinine which is a second-line
treatment administered to pregnant women in their
first trimester [14].
The design of the ACT procurement and delivery sys-
tem should ensure availability in the public sector. How-
ever, Tanzania along with its neighbours, has been
experiencing public sector ACT stock-outs over the past
five years [6,15-21] which cripples the delivery of health
care services. Our objective is to investigate the impact
of public sector ACT stock-outs together with healthworker behaviour on care-seeking during a fever episode
and the associated household expenditures.
Methods
Data for our case-study were obtained from the Ulanga
District in South East Tanzania with an estimated popu-
lation of 265,203 according to the 2012 census and with
a malaria parasite prevalence rate in children under five
years of age as tested by a Rapid Diagnostic Test (RDT)
of 13.0% in 2011 [22]. Health service infrastructure in
Ulanga is composed of two hospitals (one public), three
health centres and 30 dispensaries (16 public). The esti-
mated population per facility is 4,571. We combined
data from three surveys carried out in Ulanga District
between November 2009 and August 2011.
Household behaviour and expenditure
We used longitudinal survey data on household costs dra-
wing on the International Network for the Demographic
Evaluation of Populations and Their Health (INDEPTH)
Effectiveness and Safety Studies of Anti-malarial Drugs in
Africa (INESS) methodology, starting in September 2009
until present [23]. Rolling daily household surveys in the
Ifakara Health and Demographic Surveillance Site (HDSS)
identify fever episodes using a two week recall where a ran-
domly pre-selected group is chosen for an in-depth ques-
tionnaire on their behaviour and expenditures. There was
no clinical verification that a fever episode was a case of
malaria. Data on individual treatment seeking pathways,
access to treatment, outcomes, services at provider
level and household costs are captured, together with
other key indicators such as the different treatments
and sources of medicines as well as the total cost.
Direct financial costs are considered to include direct
medical costs such as consultation fees, prescription fees
and charges for medicines, together with non-medical
costs such as transport, accommodation, food, water and
mobile phone use in addition to any gift payments.
Respondents are grouped into public or private sector
based on their first provider, even if they received medi-
cines from the other.
Household demographics
As part of the Ifakara HDSS, households are visited
three times a year and once a year an asset survey is ad-
ministered. The socio-economic status of households is
based on 15 dichotomous variables using principle com-
ponent analysis (PCA) [24,25]. The index was constructed
for 5,676 of the households from the following dichotom-
ous variables: ownership of a bicycle (65% of households);
radio (69%); mobile phones (43%); watch (6%) and iron
(5%); living in rented accommodation (11%); as well as
various characteristic of the dwelling such as: mud floor
(83%); cement floor (9%); stone walls (33%); brick walls
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electricity (2%) and type of sanitary facilities including
presence of toilet (94%). The first principle component ex-
plained 23% of the variability in socio-economic scores.
Greatest weight was given to having a cement floor (0.38),
the use of kerosene for cooking fuel (0.34) and ownership
of a mobile phone (0.30). Households were classified into
wealth quintiles based on their PCA sores and assigned
their own socio-economic scores index. Household and
health facility Geographic Information Systems (GIS) co-
ordinates were also collected in the HDSS. Health facility
catchment areas were determined using the ArcGIS soft-
ware [26] to create 1km Euclidian buffers around health
facilities.
SMS for life
We used information provided by the SMS for Life pro-
ject [27] which monitors weekly stock-levels via a mobile
phone Short Messaging System (SMS) on all four dose
levels of the ACT Coartem in 35 health facilities in
Ulanga, of which eight were also covered by the Ifakara
HDSS. Of these eight, we excluded two as they were in
the same village and therefore could not be associated
with individual catchment households resulting in a total
of six health facilities included (five dispensaries and one
health centre). We identified the number and pattern of
weeks where they were stocked out of all four doses of
ACT. ACT stock-out was defined when all four ACT
doses were stocked out since health workers cope with a
stock-out of one dose by dividing blister packets from
others. If in a given week the health worker did not re-
spond to the SMS, this was considered a stock-out only
if it was a preceded or followed by a reported stock-out.
From (and including) November 2009 until (and inclu-
ding) August 2011, there were 576 health facility weeks
of data of which 82 (14%) reported total stock-out.
Informed consent was obtained for this study from the
Tanzania National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR/
HQ/R.8a/Vol.IX/998).
Univariate logistic models were fitted to assess the ef-
fect of predictors on household expenditure during care
seeking for fever and whether these varied across wealth
quintiles. All analysis was done using Stata 10.
We defined non-compliance for user fee charges in
the public sector as charging patients user fees contrary
to policy (i.e. for patients who were under the age of five
or over the age of 60 or who were covered by health in-
surance) or when individuals who did not qualify for one
of the above exemptions were charged over TZS1,000
(using the higher user fee). Non-compliance for medi-
cines management was defined as cases where a fee of
more than TZS1,000 was charged in the public sector
for medicines as ACTs were supposed to be dispensed
for TZS300 (or free), and a combination of antipyreticand other basic medicines would cost no more than
TZS1,000. Non-compliance for medicines management
was also defined in cases when a monotherapy (SP or
quinine) was dispensed, either in the public or private
sector, apart from when this was given for free in a pub-
lic sector facility to a female of reproductive age, accord-
ing to Standard Treatment Guidelines for women in
their first trimester of pregnancy who should receive
quinine for the treatment of uncomplicated malaria [2].
Referral to the private sector to purchase medicines dur-
ing stock-in periods was also considered non-compliant
behaviour by health workers. Fever cases not receiving an
antimalarial were not considered as non-compliant as
there may have been other symptoms that suggested an-
other diagnosis, or a negative test from a RDT. We believe
that ACT stock-outs in the public sector are in part a
result of the inability of healthcare workers to reliably en-
sure that medicines are ordered appropriately and on time
(in addition to non-compliant behaviour of individuals
higher up on the supply chain) and therefore incidents of
care seeking during an ACT stock-out were also attributed
to non-compliant behaviour of health workers. Further-
more, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that
the cost of non-compliant behaviour in the public sec-
tor resulting in stock-outs also results in costs experienced
by households seeking care (purchasing ACTs) in the pri-
vate sector if these occurred during an ACT stock-out.
This is because only 9% of total care seeking chose the pri-
vate sector during times when the public sector was
stocked in, as well as the fact that news of public sector
ACT stock-outs spreads quickly in times of frequent
stock-outs of commonly sought products. Some patients
may therefore go directly to nearby private sector facilities
for treatment. While these costs may not have arisen di-
rectly as a consequence of non-compliant health worker
behaviour, they nonetheless would not have arisen if
health staff and others in the procurement and supply
chain system had been ‘compliant’ with their own policies
and processes to avoid stock-outs. Finally, the cost to the
household of non-compliance may be defined as the
difference between the average direct cost for compliant




There were 439 INESS fever interviews in the Ulanga
District between November 2009 and August 2011. From
these, we excluded respondents whose closest health faci-
lity was not one of the six, or who sought treatment from
another source such as from a friend or family, or a tra-
ditional healer. We also excluded respondents who went to
a hospital as this involved cases of complicated malaria re-
quiring inpatient care. Two outliers were removed as they
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Of the remaining 333 fever cases, 192 (58%) sought initial
care from the public sector and 141 (42%) from the private
sector. The most common private sector outlets were
Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs) (62%);
others went to private pharmacies and shops.
86% of fever cases received an antimalarial (ACT,
quinine or SP) (see Figure 1) of which the most common
was ACT (72%). The rest took an antipyretic such as as-
pirin, panadol, ibuprofen or diclofenac.
ACT and quinine were most commonly obtained from
the public sector, whilst SP was predominantly obtained
in the private sector. The majority (58%) of those who
received SP were men, against policy.
The costs experienced by respondents seeking treat-
ment in each of the two sectors (private and public) are
illustrated in Figure 2.
The total direct cost of seeking treatment for fever
was TZS285 (19%) higher in the private than in the pub-
lic sector (95% CI: 139 – 857). This was largely due to
higher (73%) average medical costs where the difference
between both means was TZS736 (95% CI: 428 – 1044).
Non medical costs where also nearly four times higher
(95% CI: 124 – 448) in the private sector compared
to the public sector, although transport costs were
lower. In addition, patients seeking care in the private
sector were not charged a consultation fee, which
made-up about one quarter of the direct public sector
treatment.
A more detailed breakdown of these costs, showing cases
which were subjected to non-compliant behaviour of any
sort by health care workers can be seen from Figure 3.
Non-compliant behaviour was relatively more common in
the public sector, with overcharging for medicines being


















Figure 1 Distribution of medicines taken for fever, by type
and source, Ulanga District, Tanzania, November 2009 –
August 2011.Cost of non-compliant behaviour
The cost of non-compliant health worker and health sys-
tem behaviour in the Ulanga District for those seeking
fever treatment in the period 2009-2011 is estimated
as USD1.62 or TZS2,322 per episode of fever. When
health workers and shop workers are compliant, the
cost is lower in the public sector than the private sec-
tor (USD0.96, TZS1,372). However, in non-compliant
cases, the reverse is true with the cost of care being
marginally lower in the private sector compared to
the public sector (USD0.27, TZS387).
Stock-out analysis
Out of the total sample, 7% of respondents sought treat-
ment for fever during an ACT stock-out and their direct
costs were 21% higher at TZS1,921 (95% CI: 1251-2590)
compared to those who sought treatment during a
stock-in [TZS1,584 (95% CI: 1353-1815)]. The majority
of these patients (79%) received their medicines from
the private sector which explains the high direct costs.
Of these, 53% obtained an ACT. Due to the small sam-
ple size of respondents seeking care during an ACT
stock-out, we were unable to confirm whether the in-
crease in costs during fever seeking was statistically sig-
nificant (p = 0.44).
PCA scores were available for 286 households and re-
gression analysis suggested that those in the higher
socio-economic quintile tended to use the private sector
more, although the difference was not statistically sig-
nificant. The consumption of antimalarials did not vary
significantly across socio-economic quintiles, although
the poorest were more likely to take a (cheaper) antipy-
retic. Healthcare seeking expenses did not vary signifi-
cantly across socio-economic quintiles, although those
in the higher socio-economic quintile tended to spend
more (TZS126, 95% CI: -14.78 – 267.14, p = 0.08).
Limitations
The INESS data included hospitalization costs which were
a lump sum of medical costs, laboratory costs and bed
costs. As some respondents who went to a dispensary re-
ported only hospitalization costs, we distributed these
costs between medicines (80%) and consultation (20%) on
the basis of the observed average distribution among re-
spondents who incurred both costs. There were also in-
consistencies in the household data where for example,
people going to a private shop reported having bed costs,
or reporting no cost. Also, it is likely that the two week re-
call of respondents would have affected data quality. Fi-
nally, SMS for Life includes long periods of non-reporting;
for example, in 2011 more than one in three weeks (37%)
had missing data. Furthermore, SMS for Life only counts
boxes in the store room, not in the dispensing room,




















Figure 2 Average cost (TZS) of fever treatment in both the public and private sector, Ulanga, Tanzania, November 2009 – August
2011. Note: Non-medical costs include: food, water, lodging, phone, gift payments. TZS 1,434 = USD1 (average exchange rate during the study
period 2009- 2011). Source: Bank of Tanzania. There were no consultation costs in the private sector.
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The frequent ACT stock-outs which have occurred in
Tanzania have not been well documented in the litera-
ture. The aim of this case-study was to better under-
stand household behaviour and expenditures duringTotal: 333 TZS 1,608
Public: 193 (58%) TZS 1,488
Compliant: 88 (46%) TZS 201


















Figure 3 Care seeking and average direct costs during fever episodes
that the number of non-compliant cases (i.e. cases subject to non-complia
to total non-compliant cases due to some individuals experiencing more th
fever treatment.care-seeking for fever in the Ulanga District and whether
they varied during an ACT stock-out. However, from
our results stock-outs accounted for a relatively small
proportion (less than 10%) of the non-compliant beha-








 during ACT 
stock-in: 24
(23%) 
Non-compliant: 50 (36%) TZS 2,136
ompliant: 90 (64%) TZS 1,573
Overcharged 
consultation:
28 (27%) Overcharged 
medicines: 53
(50%) 
, Ulanga District, Tanzania, November 2009 – August 2011. Note
nt behaviour of health care workers) in the public sector does not sum
an one non-compliant behaviour at the health facility during
Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:444 Page 6 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/444attending the public health facilities for treatment. By far,
the largest contributor to non-compliant behaviour was
overcharging for medicines and/or consultations and
not respecting health insurance status, as also noted in
Tanzania by others [28-30]. Non-compliant health worker
behaviour has also been found in other African countries
such as Uganda [20,31] Ethiopia [32] and Zambia [19].
Overcharging for services or goods that are supposed
to be free could be an outcome of various dysfunctional
elements across the health system. Within the informa-
tion system, overcharging could be a result of lack of in-
formation among patients who may be under informed
on their rights and entitlements. Indeed, during our field
visits, we did not observe any posters displayed at health
facilities stating the fee-for-service or patient rights.
Similarly, lack of information could be occurring on the
supply side where health facility staff are unaware of the
fee-for-service guidelines. Health system stewards could
consider strengthening information flows by designing
interventions aimed at increasing health worker train-
ing on user fee policies followed by reminder messages
using mobile phones.
Overcharging could also be occurring due to weak-
nesses in the financing system especially with regards to
payment of salaries to health workers, who may be over-
charging as a coping mechanism, either because of salary
delays or because funding to the health facility is irregu-
lar and limited. If this is the case, then stewards would
need to review the remuneration system for health
workers and streamline the flow of funds to health faci-
lities. Another potential intervention could be to allow
more access to funds received at the health facilities
through cost sharing schemes such as insurance funds
which could then be used to purchase medicines from
other sources when needed. This would reduce the fre-
quency of stock-outs and informal charges, empower the
health workers, and build trust in the health care system
among the community.
Overcharging for health care services results in a dual
burden to the health system, both by potentially discour-
aging patients from receiving care, and possibly impov-
erishing them when they do seek care. Considering that
the commodity supply cost of ACTs together with other
technologies used to prevent malaria such as bed nets
and RDTs are nearly fully donor funded in Tanzania, it
is perhaps surprising that the 2009/2010 National Health
Accounts found that approximately 40% of total malaria
expenditure came from households [4]. This is particu-
larly concerning as out-of-pocket costs for medicines
tend to be the second largest family expenditure item
after food in developing countries [33], resulting in
equity and impoverishment implications, together with
creating barriers for universal coverage. Socio-economic
considerations are important as our results indicatedthat the least poor tended to use the private sector more
than the poorest households. There could be a combin-
ation of demand and supply factors that contribute to
this observation, on the demand side, the least poor may
want to avoid long queues and therefore go directly to
the private sector to purchase medicines. On the supply
side, unpublished work from the Ifakara HDSS running
in this district has geo-positioned all households and has
socio-economic status of a large sample of households,
it shows that the least poor quintile is more commonly
located in the centre of large villages (merchants,
teachers, other elites, etc) while the poorest are more
scattered and distributed in and between small villages
(peasant farmers, etc.).a The implication of this is that
the poor rely on the public health care system to provide
health services, and when these are either not available,
or not accessible, it becomes an indicator of health sys-
tem failure.
At just under 10% of the non-compliant behaviour ob-
served in our study, ACT stock-outs are a serious issue
for those experiencing them, especially when they con-
cern essential medicines for a leading cause of a life
threatening condition. Stock-outs are a result of a com-
bination of governance challenges and weak system design.
The design of the current system is such that Tanzania re-
lies entirely on donor support for its ACTs, most of which
comes from the Global Fund and President’s Malarial
Initiative (PMI) [34]. Relying on donor support puts
Tanzania at risk of having to abide by external bureau-
cratic requirements. For example, a report by the Local
Fund Agent for the Global Fund in 2009 reported stock
management issues which resulted in the Global Fund
withholding around USD 1.2 million for the purchase of
ACTs [35]. A delay in Round 7 application was a conse-
quence of having to restructure the grant to host the
innovative financing mechanism ‘Affordable Medicines
Facility for malaria’ (AMFm) which aimed to lower the
price of ACTs [36]. This resulted in Tanzania only submit-
ting their proposal in June 2009 and signing the AMFm a
year later [37,38].
Another health system design feature which would
have contributed to the ACT stock-out was the nature
of the supply chain system which is based on a ‘pull’ sys-
tem. That is, medicines availability is entirely based on
whether health facilities order the correct amount of
medicines at the right time from MSD.
Tanzania could consider redesigning the medicine sup-
ply system to simplify the way that funds are transferred
to the MSD for procurement. Understanding the re-
source constraints of health budgets in developing coun-
tries, Tanzania could take the opportunity of subsidised
ACTs through the AMFm program (first orders were re-
ceived July 2011) to allocate a small portion of domestic
funds to co-finance ACT purchases, including creating a
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With the introduction of RDTs to accurately diagnose
malaria, fewer ACT doses will be required. Health
system stewards could also consider carrying out an ex-
ternal assessment of the medicines quantification, pro-
curement and supply system to identify and address
barriers, potentially considering moving towards a sys-
tem which did not rely entirely on health workers pla-
cing medicines orders in on time.
There are also a range of governance challenges centred
around lack of accountability and transparency which can
contribute to stock-outs. Tools like SMS for Life can
greatly increase transparency of medicines stocks and
identify where the barriers are, but this is only if they are
being widely accessed, which at present it is not due to the
website being password protected. Therefore, many in-
volved in the forecasting, procurement and delivery of
ACTs may be unaware of stock-outs at the dispensary
level as they only monitor stock levels in the national or
zonal warehouse. If there was more transparency, perhaps
accountability would increase along the supply chain and
which may reduce any unjustifiable referral to the private
sector, especially when ACTs are in stock.
Our results indicate that in a stock-out period house-
hold expenditure during care seeking for fever increased
(this was not statistically significant). However, average
district ACT stock-out rates are increasing. For 2009,
2010, and 2011, district ACT stock-out rates were, re-
spectively, 8.3%, 11.4% and 34.1%, and so a district ana-
lysis today may yield statistically significant increases in
household expenditure results. The predominant periods
of ACT stock-outs were November 2009; July to August
2010; and the most severe was between March – August
2011, corresponding to the peak period of malaria trans-
mission. Thus, in addition to the economic consequences
of ACT stock-outs, it would not be unreasonable to expect
sever health consequences in affected communities, al-
though this remains to be established.
The irregular public sector ACT availability could have
been one of the principal factors contributing to nearly
half the respondents going to the private sector for fever
treatment, especially since cost of care in the private sec-
tor for fever treatment was only slightly higher (19%)
than in the public sector. Our case-study does not exa-
mine the private sector ACT stock, which may have
been higher following the earlier introduction of AMFm
funded ACTs compared to the public sector. Another fac-
tor dissuading patients from seeking care at public health
facilities was the prevalent practice of overcharging.
Overcharging (an average, per case, of TZS200 per
patient) was also reported in a GIZ 2011 study on the
availability of medicines which found in one district that
health facilities were overcharging patients to pay for
security services [18].Our overall costing results differ from those of Somi
et al. (2007) who calculated the direct cost of fever/malaria
treatment in the same Ifakara HDSS site in 2004 and
found the public sector to be 61% more expensive that the
private sector [39]. Using GDP deflators from the World
Bank, the average direct cost in 2004 was TZS1,184, 50%
or so higher than the average cost during our study
(TZS767). A direct comparison is difficult because in 2004
the first line antimalarial was SP which was at the time
much more inexpensive than ACT. Choloroquine was also
still popular in the shops and very inexpensive.
The annual number of malaria cases reported in public
health facilities in Tanzania is estimated at between 14 –
18 million [40]. If over half of these cases experienced
additional costs (USD1.62) due to the non-compliant
behaviour of health system employees, the estimated
total additional expenditure born by households would
be between USD12.2 - USD15.7 million. This represents
about 3.6 - 4.6% of the total health expenditure on ma-
laria in Tanzania (USD340 million [4]). Furthermore, an
estimated 68% of the population in 2007 live on less that
USD1.25 a day [41] suggesting that their daily income
was consumed entirely due to governance failures for
each fever episode.
Conclusions
We investigated the behaviour and expenditure of
households during fever seeking in the Ulanga district in
Tanzania in 2010 -2011 when the district, like the rest of
the country, was experiencing frequent periods of ACT
stock-out. The main governance issue affecting the proper
delivery of health services during a fever episode observed
in our case-study was non-compliant health worker be-
haviour at public health facilities. Among other things, this
results in decreasing the cost gap between the private and
public sector. Had the public sector workers been fully
compliant, treatment costs in the private sector would
be significantly larger than those in the public sector.
In addition to overcharging for medicines and ser-
vices, another element of public sector worker non-
compliant behaviour was ACT stock-outs, which we
estimate increased the cost of care during fever treat-
ment by 21% compared to treatment costs during a
stock-in. For those seeking care during an ACT stock-
out, the majority went to the private sector. Costs in
the private sector were 19% higher than the public
sector which would explain the higher costs for those
seeking treatment during an ACT stock-out.
As the ACT stock-out rate in our case-study was low
compared to the district average, we were unable to fully
assess its impact. However, our results demonstrated
that there are other important governance challenges in
the health system that increase household expenditure
during care-seeking for fever. Now that SMS for Life is
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ting data sources become available, we encourage a larger
scale study to assess the national impact on household
expenditures of an ACT stock-out. Furthermore, an in-
vestigation into the long term health consequences of
people not accessing the first line antimalarial would be
important for health services management policy. With
potential ACT resistance, it is imperative that Tanzania se-
cures a stable ACT supply with adequate buffer stock and
implements the use of RDTs to provide the population
with an affordable treatment against one of the major
public health concerns and work towards the goal of
universal coverage for malaria treatment.
Endnote
aMasanja, H. et al (2005) Ifakara Health Institute, Dar
es Salaam.
Key messages
 Public health facilities in Tanzania have experienced
frequent prolonged stock-out episodes of the first
line antimalarial treatment (ACT) since 2009.
 Non-compliant health worker behaviour was
observed for 54% of patients attending public sector
facilities at District level in Tanzania.
 Non-compliant health worker behaviour increased
out-of-pocket household expenditures in the public
sector by a factor of twelve.
 Health system design and governance issues need to
be addressed to reduce this additional cost burden
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